Proportional Representation
by Leland McInnes
Electoral reform, and specifically proportional representation, is becoming an increasingly common topic in Canadian politics. As someone who lived and voted in a country as it transitioned from First Past the Post (FPP), as used here in Canada, to the Mixed Member Proportional electoral system (MMP), I would like to share my insights on the subject.
I am from New Zealand, and during the late 80's and early 90's New Zealand was having discussions about electoral reform very similar to those in Canada today. In New Zealand's case this movement toward electoral reform can be traced largely to a particularly anomalous result in the 1984 election. That year a newly formed party, the New Zealand Party, managed to gain widespread support across the country and won over 12% of the vote nationally; despite such significant support the party failed to win any seats in parliament. This result, a quirk of the First Past the Post system, sowed the seeds of electoral discontent, and a commission on electoral systems was established to consider the issue. For the next several years discussion of electoral reform grew in importance, resulting in a series of referenda in 1992 and 1993 on electoral reform.
During the referenda, debate about electoral systems became a central issue, with most of the focus placed on contrasting the existing First Past the Post system with the system recommended by the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems, Mixed Member Proportional, where half the MPs are elected directly, and the rest are elected proportionally. From my point of view MMP had several strikes against it: it was, compared to FPP, a complicated system which would take some effort on the part of the voting public to understand; it enshrined political parties as a fundamental part of the electoral system; it gave far too much power to smaller parties as King-makers; it also had a tendency to lead to minority and coalition governments - which seemed a recipe for unstable and ineffective government. I was strongly opposed to MMP, and as such I was deeply disappointed when, in the binding 1993 referendum, it won out against First Past the Post. However, having been through several elections under MMP since that time, I am now one of MMP's most vehement supporters.
What changed my mind? Seeing the system in action, and witnessing the positive results. The first issue is the claimed complexity of the system. In practice it is not that difficult to grasp: you get two votes, one for a local electorate (riding) representative, and one for a party; half of the MPs in parliament are elected via ridings as normal (and can include independent candidates), and the remaining MPs are selected from party lists, decided upon internally by each party and published prior to the election, such that each party's representation in parliament is proportional its share of the nationwide party vote. There are some minor provisos regarding minimum thresholds (in New Zealand a party is required to get at least 5% of the party vote, or at least one riding representative before they can have members elected in proportion to the party vote), but that is essentially all there is to it. Between the 1993 referendum and the following election in 1996 there was an education blitz with leaflets sent out, and television advertising and even whole programs devoted to explaining how the system worked. The 1996 election, the first under the new system, went flawlessly. The problem of the complexity simply never arose.
The second issue was that the system made political parties a fundamental aspect of electoral politics. On this front MMP is guilty as charged. By having the exact make up of parliament determined by the nationwide party vote, political parties become very important. The question that needs to be asked, however, is whether that is not already the case. Most political campaigning under FPP focuses heavily on which party the candidate is a member of, and voting tends follow from party affiliation. Political parties already define the political landscape - is recognising that really so bad? In practice voters in New Zealand have been freed from party politics, at least as far as local representatives are concerned: having two votes allows you to vote for whichever candidate you feel will do the best job of representing you in your riding regardless of any party affiliation, while still allowing you to express a party preference and shape the make up of parliament with your party vote. Elections in New Zealand have borne this out with popular representatives getting elected in ridings that swung in a different direction with the party vote.
The power granted to smaller parties by MMP is a more interesting issue. In the 1996 election neither of the two major parties in New Zealand won enough votes to gain a majority. That left a small populist party in the centre acting as the King-maker and wielding undue influence. It seemed that the predicted dangers of MMP had come to pass. For several weeks after the election there were long drawn out talks before a coalition with the right-leaning National Party was eventually announced. The smaller party threw its weight around during the next three years, and come the 1999 election found themselves comprehensively crushed in the polls. In practice the electorate has little taste for small parties trying to extort larger ones. Since that time the smaller parties in New Zealand have rapidly learned not to swing above their weight - it is detrimental to their long term survival.
The remaining issue is perhaps the most commonly voiced criticism of proportional representation schemes, yet just like the other issues it has proved to be more of a theoretical problem rather than a practical one. Certainly MMP produces far more minority and coalition governments than FPP. In practice this has actually proved to be a positive, rather than negative, point for MMP. In essence the system has helped force politicians to grow up. Politicians or parties that exploit their position as King-maker, or generate instability in a coalition or minority government, quickly find themselves punished by the electorate come the next election. Politicians or parties that are willing to negotiate and even cross the floor to find consensus and agreement on some issues find they fare much better in the polls. Several New Zealand politicians learned this lesson the hard way. As a result politicians grew up, and the feared instability never arrived. What of the lack of effectiveness of minority governments? Again, in practice, it rarely arises. When significant change or more immediate action is called for the smaller parties find themselves short on support as voters rally behind major parties seeking to give them the required majority. In times when the electorate is comfortable with the direction of the country the smaller parties find more votes, giving greater voice to more diverse issues. Once voters become used to how the system works, the electorate can show surprising intelligence and subtlety. In 2002, when the New Zealand Green Party was faring well in the polls and was looking likely to wield significant power in coalition with the left leaning Labour Party, there was a huge swing away from the major conservative party in favour of Labour, significantly diminishing the Greens' say in parliament in favour of the far more moderate Labour party.
So with flaws in MMP turning out to be theoretical phantoms, the question remains as to whether it offers any advantages. It does. MMP has lead to a more mature outlook from politicians who now have to look to negotiation and consensus building amongst other parties that have a similar outlook. Politics has become somewhat less confrontational with parties just as interested in showing common ground as they are in highlighting differences. What proportional representation, and greater diversity in smaller parties, really offers the electorate is much more fine tuned control of government policy. New Zealand now has an interesting diversity of smaller parties, many of which find representation, albeit small, in parliament. For example the Green Party offers similarity to left leaning Labour, but differs on issues like carbon tax, and genetically modified foods. In contrast the ACT party is strongly right leaning on economic issues, even more so than the conservative National Party, but socially very liberal. These parties, then, offer the voter the opportunity to support the general direction of the more major parties while voicing their dissent on those particular issues they disagree on, be it stronger environmental concerns, more liberal social policy, or whatever else is important to their party of choice. The more power these smaller parties get, the more seriously the major parties must consider re-evaluating their position on these issues. First Past the Post, by failing to accurately represent smaller parties, supports the politics of artificial dichotomy in which your views on a single issue supposedly define your positions on everything else. I know that my political opinions are not that easily pigeonholed, and that's why I support systems that actually allow me to most accurately express my views.